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Introduction
ALAN FREEMAN*
N the summer of 1987, I was invited, in my capacity as a constitu-
tional law teacher, to appear on a noontime television news show on
the day of the Constitutional Bicentennial. I accepted, warning the
newscasters that I would use all of my alloted time to denounce Robert
Bork, whose nomination to the Supreme Court was then before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee. I further suggested that nothing else seemed
more appropriate as a way of marking the historic anniversary. My hosts
did not disagree; the event took place.
My little effort was somewhat different from the mainstream cele-
bration and self-congratulation of the day. Apart from Thurgood Mar-
shall's reminder that the Constitution offered little to such as slaves and
women, the prevailing mood of the Bicentennial was arrogant and com-
placent, rooted in the notion that a big and important job had been done
back in the 18th century by a group of wise men, and that the job once
done was over, bequeathing to us a magic artifact that could and would
endure and solve all of our political problems. The celebratory mood fit
in neatly with the Reagan administration's call for a "jurisprudence of
original intent" as the sure solution to contemporary constitutional
problems.
Both a talismanic belief in the power of the sacred text and a similar
belief in the reality of "original intent" are dangerous romantic fantasies.
Such fantasies elicit in me the spirit of the questioning child in The Em-
peror's New Clothes, the spirit of critical inquiry central to the academic
calling. The men who framed the constitution could not have had any
objective original intent, since they harshly and vigorously disagreed
* Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at
Buffalo.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
with one another on almost every basic issue. The document produced
was a compromise, hardly a basis for coherent interpretation, since com-
promises all too often dissolve back into the conflicts that they seek to
obfuscate. What the framers did have in common was that they were
rich, white, men who, not surprisingly, sought to protect their interests
as such against the chaotic forces of the powerless. Even that job was not
done by the document acting on its own, but by another rich, white,
man-John Marshall-who, drawing on like-minded sources such as Al-
exander Hamilton, made up constitutional law, sometimes in spite of the
apparent intent of the framers,I to insure maximum protection for credi-
tors and vested rights.2 Thus, from its inception constitutional law was
active and politically conscious interpretation, not the passive reading of
a text that spoke for itself.
Some of the most difficult questions, such as the status of Native
Americans, and the future of slavery, were purposely left unresolved in
the Constitution. Those who celebrate the endurance and continuity of
the document nearly always leave out the fact that it took the bloodiest
war in American history to resolve an issue with Which the framers could
not cope. And the aftermath of that war transformed the document for-
ever, by the amendments, making it one that could speak, however softly,
to the aspirations of the powerless, oppressed, and formerly enslaved.
The essays in this volume share a commitment to regard constitu-
tional law and the Constitution itself from a critical rather than
celebratory perspective. They seek to clarify, not to romanticize; they
look to the past not to rationalize the present but to recover possibilities
for a future that might be less hierarchical and more egalitarian.
Those who quest for original intent, according to Mark Tushnet,
would do better to quest for a unicorn. Tushnet points out that the ac-
tual intent of the "framers" cannot be figured out at all, that their de-
bates about method were actually serious disagreements about results,
1. The classic example of this phenomenon is Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), in which Marshall deployed facile manipulation to conclude that the authors of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 (the intent of which must have been fairly close to that of the framers) enacted a provi-
sion that was unconstitutional
2. See eg., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (vested right in land protected under
contract clause despite the fact that the source of title was bribery of the Georgia legislature, which
was rescinded within a year by the succeeding legislature); Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheaton) 122 (1819) (striking down a bankruptcy law as violative of the contract clause). Marshall
failed to get his way, however, in the 4-3 decision in Ogden v. Saunders. 25 U.S. (12 Wheaton) 212
(1827). Marshall argued that even aprospective bankruptcy law violated the contract clause since it
might, among other things, "threaten the existence of credit," "sap the morals of the people, and
destroy the sanctity of private faith." 25 U.S. (12 Wheaton) at 224-25.
[Vol. 36
INTRODUCTION
and that they masked differences by resorting to vague abstractions. We
cannot escape the fact that reading is an affirmative act, one that always
implies choice. Jennifer Jaff, in a "pre"-view of Tushnet's new book on
constitutional law, offers his general views on quests for objective bases of
interpretation, concluding that "critique is all there is"; there is no truth,
but hope.
Regardless of its objective knowability, we do experience constitu-
tionalism as an ongoing cultural reality, a dialogue with the past, with
the text, and with ourselves. Peter Gabel, deploying expertise in both
law and psychology, seeks to understand the "socio-psychoanalytic"
meaning of our persistence in trying to regain the intent of the framers,
despite *the hopelessness of the quest. He sees this recurring political
move as a largely right-wing attempt to build a magic bond of false com-
munity through the marketing of a mythical, historical narrative of ori-
gin. He suggests that the underlying project of proponents of original
intent is to infuse our relationship to the founding Fathers with a new
"sado-masochistic fervor."
Central to the political worldview of liberal legalism embodied in
the Constitution is the split between the realms of public and private.
The Mensch/Freeman essay explores the way this dichotomy is exper-
ienced as real, in both law and daily life, despite its basic incoherence.
They suggest that the ideological character of the public/private distinc-
tion serves to legitimize oppression while denying us access to more com-
munitarian forms of social life.
If the meaning of constitutionalism is rooted in particular cultural
or historical context, cultural difference will likely lead to different ver-
sions of constitutionalism. The Fraser/Freeman dialogue is an effort to
demonstrate this point by comparing the ostensibly similar (not to
Canadians but to Americans in their complacent failure of observation)
but, in reality, very different cultures of the United States and Canada.
Having adopted a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canadians are won-
dering whether they have begun the Americanization of Canadian legal
culture, or whether the peculiarly Canadian approach to issues of author-
ity, community, and public responsibility will produce a distinctively Ca-
nadian version of constitutionalism and rights as the Charter is
interpreted and experienced by Canadians.
That constitutionalism is not a thing but a process, not a moment
but a dynamic flow, not an artifact but an ongoing project, is captured in
the form of allegory by Allan Hutchinson. He shows how conflicts such
as that between "law as game" and "law as abstract principle," or be-
19871
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tween cultural context and mythic form, are never resolved, since com-
promise always means avoidance of detail. His account of
constitutionalism is thus a neverending dialectic of power and
interpretation.
If one does want to go back to the beginning, not for the recovery of
a romanticized original intent, but for genuine historical understanding,
the results offer much more complexity than coherence. In a pair of es-
says, Wythe Holt shows us how a serious and careful historian deals with
the original intent issue. Holt emphasizes detail and particularity, re-
vealing a diversity of persons and political positions. That there were
serious disagreements about the role of federal courts led the framers to
compromise by leaving the issue largely open. No sooner had the Judici-
ary Act of 1789 put a structure in place, than efforts began to dismantle
and replace it. Holt traces the struggle in the 1790's between those who
sought to insure national supremacy by federalizing the state courts, on
the one hand, and those who sought to return power to the states by
taking away the Supreme Court's power to review state court decisions,
on the other. These struggles suggest that the framers were hardly of one
mind on these important and basic questions of federalism. Holt illus-
trates in his second essay the similar ideological struggles that made it
impossible in the 1790s, with one exception, to relieve the Supreme Court
Justices from the arduous burden of circuit-riding.
Two of the essays serve not to criticize constitutionalism but to criti-
cize the critics, albeit from the left. These essays should make it clear
that there is hardly any consensus among critical legal scholars as to
method, theory, or anything else: L. H. Larue chides critical legal schol-
ars for overemphasizing doctrine in their treatment of judicial decisions
and for failing to take sufficient account of historical context. One cannot
quarrel with his substantive point; and he does an admirable job of dem-
onstrating its value in enhancing the understanding of three Supreme
Court cases whose context was the emergence of the labor movement in
19th century Chicago. Larue may, however, be overgeneralizing in his
characterization of CLS scholars. There is more diversity, and more his-
torical context,3 than his essay implies, even if Mark Tushnet says that
CLS scholarship is "ahistorical."
Anthony Chase seizes on the Tushnet and Gabel essays as represen-
3. One need go no further than our own critical legal household to find recent examples. See
e.g., Mensch, Religion, Revival, and the Ruling Class: A Critical History of Trinity Church, 36 BUr-
FALO L. REV. 427 (1987) and Freeman, Racism, Rights, and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A
Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988).
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tative of everything that is wrong with CLS scholarship about constitu-
tional law. That there is more to political critique than the repeated
demonstration of indeterminacy seems a fair criticism, regardless of
Tushnet's insistence on the hegmony of the indeterminacy principle. But
there is a lot more to CLS than indeterminacy, as Chase should know.
His criticism of Gabel stems from his displeasure that CLS people, or at
least some of them, do something called "local politics." He character-
izes Gabel's efforts as "micro-techniques of power criticism." Though he
concedes that Gabel is well-intentioned, he calls for an emphasis on
"macro" issues and real politics, by which he. seems to mean a return to
the fantasy reductionism of Grand Theory. That there should be vigor-
ous debate over these issues seems obvious. I for one think that one can
be very political and unpretentiously "local" at the same time.

